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THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE
WITNESSES AS A PART OF DUE PROCESS
IN HEARINGS BEFORE COLORADO
AGENCIES
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON*

INTRODUCTION

Many a lawyer has been shocked by a decision of an agency or
commission that is completely opposed to the jury-trial rules of
evidence as he has learned and applied them in a court of law. The
same attorney feels crucified when the Supreme Court upholds the
agency's ruling and condones the agency's act, announcing that
such action is fair and adequate procedure for agencies and commissions. The particular problem discussed in this article concerns
a vital feature of our law, and that is whether or not cross-examination of adverse witnesses in administrative hearings is a vital element in determining its fairness. This is controversial in nature
and unsettled, and it is not the purpose of this article to settle the
controversy. The purpose is, however, to discuss the law of Colorado pertaining to cross-examination of adverse witnesses in
agency proceedings as distinguished from the absolute right to
cross-examine under the jury-trial rules of evidence.
RULES OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

In recent years the quasi-judicial hearing before administrative agencies and officers has become an important, if not a basic,
part of the legal process. The courts have had to solve the new
problems arising from the multiplication of administrative agencies
without historical basis and systematic theory to guide them. Historically the common law rules of evidence arose from the process
of the jury trial and consequently apply to the jury-court only. In
Thayer's words, "Our Law of Evidence is concerned with the
operations of courts of justice; and not with ordinary inquiries
'in pais'."' Wigmore tells us that the history of the jury-trial rules
of evidence serve to warn us of the pitfalls in our path if these
rules are strictly applied to administrative tribunals. He states:
• . . any attempt to apply strictly the jury-trial rules of
evidence to an administrative tribunal acting without a
jury is an historical anomaly, predestined to probable
futility and failure.2
Applying these historical lessons, the popular view of the day
is best expressed by Wigmore in his treatise as follows:
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
mon

'Thayer, James Bradley, A Preliminzary Treatise on E''idenc'
Law, p. 270 (1898).
21 WiomouI: oN- EvrDEFNcI(,
31 (3rd ed. 1940).
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The popular view . . . is that jury-trial rules have
had their day in our system of justice; that their obstructive and irrational technicalities have made our
system nauseous and futile in its native habitat; and that
to transplant it to new fields would be an error amounting to folly. The opposite view is advocated by most courts and practicing
attorneys. They feel that the jury-trial rules of evidence are the
only safeguards we have to insure a fair method of investigation
in judicial or quasi-judicial hearings. Those who advocate this
view feel that these rules as developed are essential fundamentals
of a system of proof in a fair trial or hearing.
It is conceded by most practitioners, as a general rule, that
administrative agencies conducting hearings are not bound by the
strict or technical rules of evidence which are employed in jurytrials." This rule is being adopted by the courts in a compromising
attitude with the idea that the administrative tribunal need not
be limited by the jury-trial rules as long as somewhere in the
record there is sufficient evidence, legally acceptable by jury-trial
rules, to sustain the finding.
The state of the law in general is as it was at common law.
However, if a state statute in creating an agency declares that the
agency has the power to make its own rules of procedure, by implication any common law rule of evidence is of no effect. Some state
statutes specifically declare that an agency need not be bound by
the common law rules of evidence or by technical rules of evidence.
This clearly destroys any previously existing problem. These principals have been summarized in Corpus Juris Secundum. "
The rules of evidence are generally relaxed in administrative proceedings," and it is generally held, frequently by reason of statute, that the rules of evidence
applicable in a judicial proceeding are not binding or controlling in an administrative proceeding;7 but this does
not mean that the rules of evidence are abolished or abrogated I since the essential rules of evidence by which
rights are asserted or defended must be preserved in administrative proceedings," and under some statutes and
the rules and regulations of some administrative bodies,
the general rules of evidence applicable in judicial proceedings apply to administrative proceedings."'
The above quotation makes it clear that the laws are not uni3

Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. 450, 155 N.Y.S. 1 (1915).

'1

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

39 (3rd ed. 1940).

573 ,.J.S. 441, Sec. 122.
1U. S.-N.LR.B. v. Lightner, 113 F. 2d 621.
Durkin v. A. H. Luecht & Co., 379 Ill. 227, 40 N. E. 2d, 67.
£ U. S.-N.L.R.B. v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., C.C.A. 5, 98 F. 2d 870.
'U. S.-Bridges v. Wixon, Cal., 326 U. S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443.
,0U. S.-Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 180 F. 2d 731, affirmed 340 U. S. 498.
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form as created by the legislatures or applied by the courts, but
vary according to the kind of administrative agency and the surrounding circumstances.
THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT OR CROSS-EXAMINE

It is a general belief among lawyers that cross-examination is
the only safeguard for testing the truthfulness and value of human
statements. It has been said by many authorities that cross-examination is the greatest and most permanent contribution of the
Anglo-American system of law to the methods of trial procedure.
It is a fundamental test of truth and as such has been used and
praised by attorneys for generations. It is said in Corpus Juris,"1
A party has a right to cross-examine witnesses who
have testified for the adverse party, and this right is
absolute and not a mere privilege, and, unless subject to
cross-examination, a witness cannot testify, and it is not
within the discretion of the court to say whether or not
the right will be accorded.
It is apparent from this general statement that at common
law the cross-examination of an adverse witness was essential to
the elucidation of truth. Testimony that is offered cannot be admitted into evidence until an opportunity has been had for crossexamination.
An administrative hearing, particularly where the proceeding
is quasi-judicial, must be full, fair, and adequate. There must be
adequate notice of the issues and the issues must be clearly defined. All parties must be apprised of the evidence so that they
may explain or rebut it. Some courts say that they must be given
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence,
including rebuttal evidence, and the administrative body must
decide on the basis of the evidence. In the case of Interstate Com-2
merce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,'
the U. S. Supreme Court, after stating that the commission as an
administrative body is not bound by the strict rules of evidence
used in jury trials even where it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity,
continued as follows:
In such cases the Commissioners cannot act upon
their own information as could jurors in primitive days.
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to
offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way
can a party maintain its rights or make its defense. In
no other way can it test the sufficiency of the facts to
support the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order was without evidence, the manifest
"70 C.J. 611, Sec. 779.
' 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913).

DICTA

October, 1954

deficiency could always be explained on the theory that
the Commission had before it extraneous, unknown, but
presumptively sufficient information to support the finding. (Emphasis added)
As a result of this decision, in order-that all hearings before
the Interstate Commerce Commission be full and fair, all parties
must be apprised of the evidence presented, given an opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In Pennsylvania, in hearings before the
Public Utility Commission the same requirements are mandatory
for a fair hearing. The court said:
In no other way can a party maintain its right, or
make a defense, or13 test the sufficiency of the facts to
support the finding.
Further documentation for this rule is found in Automobile
Sales Co., Inc. v. Bowles, 14 where an action was brought to enjoin
the Office of Price Administratioa from carrying out a suspension
order revoking plaintiff's gasoline ration for a period of one year.
The court said:
The introduction of an accusing affidavit to form
the basis of proof of the truth of its contents, without
the right afforded to cross-examine the person purportedly making it, violates every known rule of evidence except in ex parte proceedings. Even the liberal rules recognized in administrative proceedings do not countenance
such proof.
Similar decisions have been rendered as to hearings before the
National Labor Relations Board, 15 and before zoning boards in the
state of Connecticut.' 6 These cases give a general application of
the right to cross-examine witnesses in administrative hearings in
the federal and state courts.
The specific problem in Colorado has seldom been attacked on
all fours. The Colorado Constitution has no article or provision
which specifically requires cross-examination in hearings before
Colorado administrative agencies. There is little statutory or case
law upon the subject. However, Colorado seems to fall among
those states which allow the administrative agencies or commissions to use their own prerogative in determining whether or not
to adopt the common law jury-trial rules of evidence. Whether or
not the agencies and courts should protect the fundamental right
to cross-examine witnesses is the major question. To determine
the answer, a synopsis of the statutes and decisions pertaining to
"In re Shenandoah Suburban Bus Lines Inc., 355 Pa. 521, 50 A. 2d 301
(1947)..
14 58 F.
Supp. 469 (Ohio, 1944).
N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, 117 F. 2d 786, 6th Cir. (1941).
'GWadell
v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of New Haven, 136 Conn. 1.
68 A. 2d 152 (1949).
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a few of the Colorado administrative agencies and boards will be
helpful.
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The statute which provides the rules of evidence and procedure to be followed in hearings before the State Industrial Commission is as follows:
Such commission or person by it duly designated,
shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure, other than as herein or by the rules of the
commission provided; but may make such investigations
in such manner as in its judgment are best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of17the parties to carry
out justly the spirit of this article.
Section 37 of the same chapter provides that in hearings before the Commission:
. . . either party shall have the right to be present at
any hearing in person or by attorney, or any other agent,
and to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the
controversy before the commission, and shall have the
right of cross-examination; provided, that the commission may with or without notice to either party cause testimony to be taken, or an inspection or investigation to be
made; the testimony so taken shall be reported to the
commission for its consideration upon final hearing. All
ex parte testimony taken by the commission shall be reduced to writing and either party shall have opportunity
to examine and rebut the same on final hearing .. 18
In the establishment of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Colorado legislature provided for cross-examination of
adverse witnesses in hearings before that Commission :'9
All parties in interest shall have the right to be
present at any hearing, in person or by attorney or by
any other agent and to present such testimony as may be
pertinent to the controversy before the commission and
shall have the right to cross-examine.
After giving the commission the right to make examinations
without notice, the statute continues as follows:
All ex parte evidence received by the commission shall
be reduced to writing and any party in interest shall
have the opportunity to examine and rebut the same by
cross-examination or by further evidence.19
COLO. STAT. AiN., c. 97, Sec. 24 (1935).
"'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, Sec. 37 (1935).
" CoLO. STAT. A.N .. C. 97, Sec. 373 (1935).
'
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The.reported law in Colorado is very meager and inadequate.
No case seems to be decided on the exact point in question. In one
Colorado case the Industrial Commission concluded that the claimant had failed in four years to establish any error, mistake, or
change of condition so as to enable claimant to show greater disability than originally determined. Then without an additional
hearing or evidence, the Commission awarded additional compensation on the ground of a change in condition. This was held to be
error and was reversed. It is clear that to allow the second award
would have deprived the employer the right to explain or rebut
the new evidence20 and the right of cross-examining the declarant
of said evidence.
Another and more recent Colorado case indirectly implies that
there is a right to cross-examine witnesses in Workmen's Compensation cases. In this case a written report of the employer's doctor
was not made a part of the case by formal order, because of a
statement of the employer's representative to the referee that they
wished to present the doctor for oral examination at a hearing to
be held in Denver, which they did not do. Claimant's counsel had
already waived cross-examination of the doctor and introduction of
the doctor's report had in fact been consented to. Any proper objection to its consideration had been waived, and it could be considered by
the commission, even though not formally offered into
2
evidence. 1
There must be a right of cross-examination before it can be
waived. The case therefore implies that the statute establishes a
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and that this claimant
waived that right. If such reasoning is followed the statute is
properly applied.
With respect to proceedings before the Commission, sections
24, 37 and 373 of the statute, as quoted above, give the Commission
a free reign in making its investigations and conducting its hearings. The technicalities of the common law are abolished, but it is
clear that the legislature did not intend to discard all safeguards.
Cross-examination of adverse witnesses, one of the most important
safeguards, is protected except in the case of certain ex parte
evidence which the Commission is given the power to obtain. In
such a case the right to cross-examine witnesses is not guaranteed,
but its use is advocated if possible. If it is not possible, the party
interested is entitled to examine the evidence and is given a right to
explain or rebut and the spirit of fair play is kept intact. The cases
cited, although not on all fours with the problem, bear out this
theory by implication.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Following the popular rule, the Legislature provided that the
0AIlan v. Gadbois, 100 Colo. 141, 66 P. 2d 331 (1937).
Ward & Co. v. Industrial Commission,
2d 52.
21 Montgomery

...

Colo .....

263 P.
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Public Utilities Commission would not be bound by the technical
jury-trial rules of evidence in its hearings. 22 Statutory authority
to cross-examine witnesses is established for all interested parties
participating in a hearing before said commission. The section
states:
At the time fixed for any hearing before the commission, any commissioner or an examiner, or, at the
time to which the same may have been continued, the applicant, petitioner, complainant, the person, firm, or corporation complained of, such person, firms, or corporations as the commission may allow to interview, and
such persons, firms, or corporations as will be interested
in or affected by any order that may be made by the commission in such proceedings shall be entitled to be heard,
examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and introduce evi23
dence.
Contra to the statute controlling hearings before the Industrial Commission, 24 the above quoted statute contains no retained
right of reasonable cross-examination, with a concurrent right to
explain or rebut if cross-examination is impossible, in cases where
the commission makes examinations and investigations without
notice and uses the ex parte evidence adduced as a result of said
investigation.
By a strict interpretation of the statute, the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses is an absolute right and to deny an
interested party this right would be to deny him a fair hearing.
In all its hearings, the commission must act strictly within the
authority conferred upon it by statute and must do so in a lawful
manner. 25 Generally speaking, a hearing before the Commission
may be regarded as an administrative investigation, the purpose
being to make findings of fact. Such a hearing must be fair and
open, with suitable opportunity being given to object to evidence
offered, to cross-examine witnesses, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. 26 Again, there is a dearth of support from decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court. However, in Snell v. The
Public Utilities Commission 27 the Court indirectly protected the
right to cross-examine witnesses and explain and rebut evidence
by reversing the order of the Commission, which modified a previous order. The carrier applied to the Commission for a permit
to operate sight-seeing buses and cars from Colorado Springs to
Stead's Ranch in Rocky Mountain National Park. The permit was
originally granted with no limitation to the number of vehicles to
be used. A petition for rehearing was denied but in the order
STAT. ANN., c.
COLO. STAT. ANN., C.
'4 COLO. STAT. ANN., C.

137, Sec. 38 (193:5).
137, Sec. 46 (1935).
97, Sections 37 and 373 (1935).
1Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P. 2d 563 (1941)
2 In re Shenandoah Suburban Bus Lines, supra note 13.
1 Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, supra note 25.
'

CoLO.
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denying a rehearing the Commission modified its first order. On
appeal, the Court in reversing the modified order held as follows:
It is elementary that a public utility commission derives its authority wholly from constitutional or statutory provisions, and possesses only such powers as are
thereby conferred. Thus, it is certain, under the facts
alleged here, that the commission was without authority
to amend or modify the original order, as was essayed,
as a part of its action in passing upon the application for
the rehearing sought.
It is apparent that the Commission was changing its mind
without granting a rehearing. The aggrieved party should have
been granted a further hearing. The Court indicates that the Commission must strictly follow the statutory provisions which govern
its hearings. In rehearings, the interested parties are entitled to
be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses, just as in
the original hearings.28 1 The substantive issues were not discussed
in the opinion.
The State Railroad Commission, referred to in COLO. STAT.
ANN., c. 29 Sec. 11 (1935), was replaced by the Public Utilities
Commission in 1913. The powers formerly exercised by the Railroad
Commission are now exercised by the Public Utilities Commission.
As a result, the statutes concerning hearings before the Public Utilities Commission apply to the railroads. In a rate making case, Denver & Salt Lake R.R. Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.- 9
the statutory provision granting the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses was applied and upheld. The case dealt with a
petition to review an order of the Public Utilities Commission
fixing an apportionment of through rates on coal to be shipped
from points in northwestern Colorado on the road of the petitioner
to points in eastern Colorado on the road of the respondent. In
the hearing documentary evidence was introduced after the arguments and the Commission admitted it into evidence and examined
and used it in its decision. The aggrieved party's counsel objected
as no opportunity was given to produce evidence, to explain or
to rebut. They were also denied the right to cross-examine the
author of the evidence used against them. This was a denial of a
fair hearing as required under due process. The Colorado Supreme
Court cited I.C.C. v. L. & N. R. R. Co. 30 as a case to sustain the objection. It is a case in which it was sought to sustain an order
of the Commission on the basis of secret evidence, that is information gathered outside of the hearing. The Court said:
The more liberal the practice in admitting testimony,
SCOLO. STAT. ANN., C. 137, Sec. 38 (1935).
- Denver and Salt Lake R. R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 64 Colo. 229,
171 P. 74 (1918).
" Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, (1913); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1927).
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the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or
defended. In such cases the commissioners cannot act,
upon their own information, as could jurors in primitive
days. All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence
submitted or to be considered, and must be given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.
In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make
its defense. In no other way can it test the facts, for
otherwise even though it appeared that the order was
without evidence, the manifest deficiency could always
be explained on the theory that the commission had before it extraneous, unknown but presumptively sufficient
information to support the finding.
This well-reasoned opinion is excellent and the Colorado
Supreme Court could well afford to cite it as its authority. It
clearly summarizes the law as it should be in all jurisdictions and
as it is in hearings before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.
LICENSING BOARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONS

There is no statutory right to cross-examine witnesses by persons brought before the Board of Medical Examiners, the Board
of Nurse Examiners, or the Board of Veterinary Examiners in
hearings brought to revoke or refuse a license to practice. Nor
is any right to cross-examine preserved by the Dental Practice Act
in hearings before the Board of Dental Examiners.
The Board of Medical Examiners, when a complaint is filed
against one holding a license to practice medicine or one applying
for such license, must serve a copy upon the person accused. The
statute goes on and says that it must be filed...
.. . together with a notice of the time and place of the
hearing thereon, advising him that he may be present
in person, and have counsel if he so desires, to offer evidence and be heard in his defense . . . the board shall
receive evidence upon the subject under consideration and
shall accord the person against whom charges are preferred a full and fair opportunity to be heard in his defense and shall adopt a resolution31 finding him guilty or
not guilty of the matters charged.
No statement is made about the rules of evidence and nothing
said about the requirements for a fair hearing. The requirements
for hearings to withhold or revoke nurses licenses are very similar.
That statute says:
...
before any license shall be revoked the holder thereof
shall be entitled to at least thirty days notice in writing
of the charge against him or her, and of the time and
'COLO.

STAr. AN.., C. 109, Sec. 33 (18)

(1935).
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place of the hearing of such charge against him or her,
at which
time and place he or she shall be entitled to be
32
heard.
The requirements for a fair hearing.before the Board of Nurse
Examiners do not establish cross-examination of adverse witnesses
as a basic right.
The Dental Practice Law 33 and the act creating the State
Board of Veterinary Medicine 34 provide fairer standards for hearings than the acts above mentioned, although no specfiic right to
cross-examine witnesses is established. The statutes provide:
Mere technicalities shall be disregarded and the
board shall not be bound by rules of evidence or rules of
procedure applicable to courts of law.
Little or no case law can be found determining a person's
rights under these statutes. However, in proceedings before a
board to revoke a license or certificate of a physician, dentist or
nurse, in other states with statutes similar to the ones adopted in
Colorado, the holder must be given an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses who testify against him.
In a Michigan case involving the revocation of a license to
practice medicine, the Supreme Court of Michigan said,
Unless the right is waived, the person charged is at
least entitled to:
1. Notice of a trial and place of hearing.
2. A hearing before a properly authorized body.
3. A reasonably definite statement of the charge or
charges preferred against the accused.
4. The right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify
against him.
5. The right to produce witnesses in his own behalf.
6. A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy
by the body
35
before whom the hearing is had.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in reviewing an action by the
State Board of Health involving a license to practice medicine said:
• . . if such license is cancelled by a board of health, it
must be upon proper charges, with opportunity to appear and defend by the introducing of evidence and the
cross-examination of
those witnesses who testify against
38
him at the hearing.
A Massachusetts case held that physicians charged with professional misconduct are entitled to make reasonable cross-examc. 114, Sec. 6 (1935).
C. 52, Sec. 14 (1935).
C. 171, Sec. 13 (1935).
- Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich.
601, 236 N. W. 225 (1931).
31 Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Nebr. 825, 119 N. W. 17 (1908).
STAT. ANN.,
' CoLO. STAT. ANN.,
4CoLO.
STAT. ANN.,

*'COLO.
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ination of witnesses making accusations.
Since there are no Colorado cases in point, it is perhaps correct to speculate that these
cases would be authority in 'applying our statutes to the case at
hand in order to insure a fair hearing.
In the Colorado case of McKay v. State Board of Medical Ex8
aminers,"
the Court held that a case to be appealed on certiorari to
the Supreme Court must raise a question of whether or not the
medical examiners regularly pursued their authority or greatly
abused their discretion. The same test applies to determining the
power of the district court to review decisions of the medical examiners and related boards.3 9 Whether or not the decision on the
merits is wrong is not within the issue. 40 Whether or not a denial
to cross-examine witnesses under the statutes is action beyond the
board's authority or an abuse of discretion has not been litigated.
The court could well seize upon such a denial and with good reasoning conclude that it is an abuse of discretion. It is the opinion of
the writer that the court would say, and rightly so, that the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses before such a board is an important safeguard and is necessary to insure a fair investigation
into the merits of the charge for which revocation of the license
is asked:
The same test was applied in a case in which the State Board
of Dental Examiners revoked a license to practice dentistry. The
Court, in speaking of the scope of review by certiorari, held that the
inquiry should be limited to whether "jurisdiction has been exceeded, discretion abused, or authority regularly pursued". The
same rule applies in cases before the Board of Nurse Examiners
in that the court may review the evidence only to determine whether
an abuse of discretion has been committed by the board. 41 In this
case, Hohn v. State Board of Nurse Examiners,42 the trial court's
decision was affirmed. No mention was made in the opinion, the
record, or the briefs of a denial of cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. It does not appear whether or not cross-examination
was allowed by the Board at the hearing. But from the opinion, it
can be implied that the Court would look at the testimony and the
facts to see if the hearing was full and fair when it said,
Under the strict rule concerning certiorari, we are
permitted to determine whether or not the board abused
ts discretion. How can we make such determination without considering the testimony and the facts before the
Board, together with the charges made? Unless we are
3Ott v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass. 566, 177 N. E. 542.
U McKay v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Colo. 305,
86 P 2d 232
(1938).
,Dilliard v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 P. 866
(1921).
0 State Board of Medical Examiners v. Noble, 65 Colo. 410, 177 P. 141 (1918).
4' Hohu v. State Board of Nurse Examiners .-..
Colo- ------ _ P. 2d .... (1954).
1953-43 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, p ......
'

Ibid.
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free to make such determination from the recorded testimony and facts, there would be no occasion for any review of any acts of a Board with statutory power only.
Courts are not to be impotent, stand idly by and allow
unrestricted exercise of authority by Boards, not granted
by statute, or permit
the arbitrary and unjustified exer43
cise of discretion.
This opinion makes it clear that the Court will protect and
uphold the rights of a party before any administrative board. To
feature a court allowing an agency to conduct a hearing without
permitting the parties to cross-examine adverse witnesses is beyond
reason. Further, assuming that the right to cross-examine is justified, the nurse was denied the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who were absent from the hearing and, as a result, the board
members did not have an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses so as to satisfy themselves in their own mind as to
the credibility of the witnesses. The theory was not brought out in
the briefs or in the Court's opinion, but it is clearly an underlying
fact of some importance and possibility.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional requirements for a fair hearing are limited
to the sections requiring due process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states,
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Article II, Section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado is similar
to the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Due process implies that every individual shall have adequate
notice, and an opportunity to be heard and defend his rights. 44
It is generally required that hearings to be valid must be fair and
open. 4 - Due process also requires that an opportunity be given to
know the claims of the opposing party and t- explain or rebut
these claims.46 These are the requirements for due process that are
generally applied. However, most enlightened courts require that
the parties be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who
testify against them.4 7 Due process also requires, among other
43Ibid.

:' In re Dlph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 P. 470.
4'Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773.
"English v. city of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155, 217 P. 2d 22.

17N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, supra note 15; In re Shenandoah Bus Lines, supra
notes 13 and 26.
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things, that there be a finding in accord with some substantial evidence.' s It appears from the authorities cited that cross-examination is not always a legal requisite for a fair hearing. The reasons
given to uphold the denial of the right to cross-examine seem rather
empty alongside the reasons given in support of the right. It seems
to be clear to most practicing attorneys and to many courts that
cross-examination of adverse witnesses is essential in obtaining
the truth. In Colorado the law is not clear. As shown above, many
of the statutes require cross-examination of adverse witnesses in
hearings before the agency to which the statute appertains. Other
statutes seem to leave it to the agencies to grant or deny the right
to cross-examine witnesses at its own discretion. Examples of such
statutes are those that do nothing more than grant the person the
right to be heard at a full and fair hearing. Other statutes are a
little more explicit and say that the board will not be bound by
technical rules of evidence or procedure.
The decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court are just as confusing when it comes to a general rule of law. In a few cases, the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses has been upheld as a requirement for a fair hearing. All too often the issue appears to
have been dodged and the cases decided upon another point. Perhaps the attorneys involved have been afraid to raise the issue,
being fearful of the result. It appears to the writer that their fears
are not supported because the trend seems to be that a denial of
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is a flagrant abuse of
discretion which the court would not tolerate if brought to its attention. A recent Colorado case supports this theory where the
court held that due process had been preserved in a case where the
injured party was represented by counsel
and given an opportunity
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to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The question is always asked, "Should any changes be made
in the law?" The answer to this question is, "Yes". The writer
feels that hearings before all administrative agencies should be
uniform. The list of administrative agencies is growing continually.
More and more litigation is being brought before the bodies already existing. The confusion that exists today for party and
counsel alike, not to speak of the members of the agencies, is tremendous. Consequently, the need for clarity and uniformity becomes very clear. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act ;'"
was adopted to assure all that the administration of government
through administrative agencies be conducted according to established procedures, which adequately protect private interests and
settle disputes in accordance with the law and evidence.51 Section
s Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. U. S., 21 Supp. 83; State Civil Service
Commission v. Hazldtt, 119 Colo. 172, 201 P. 2d 610 (1948); Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247 (1940) ; C. S. Card Iron Works Co.
v.. Radovich, 94 Colo. 426, 30 P. 2d 1108 (1933).
" School District v. Thompson, 121 Colo. 275, 214 P. 2d 1020 (1950).
m'60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. 1001.
:' GEILLHORN, WV.\
.ER, Arno IN sraTR.vTIV LAw, House Committee Report, p. 1086.
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7(c) of the Act requires that,
Every party shall have the right to present his case or
defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination
as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts.
This provision does not confer a right of unlimited crossexamination. The burden is put upon the presiding member of
the agency to determine what is reasonable and what is required
for a "full and true disclosure of the facts". The writer feels that
this provision is not strong enough and leaves too much discretion
in the hands of the presiding officer. The way is open for an abuse
of discretion by the presiding officer and the chances for a successful appeal are great. The fact remains, however, that the law
for all federal agencies is uniform and the right of reasonable crossexamination is provided for all, and an arbitrary denial of the right
to reasonably cross-examine adverse witnesses would be grounds
for reversal under the act.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws. The act has been adopted in some form in Wisconsin, North
Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio and California. In the model act
there is no limit upon the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
as in the federal act, and for this reason is superior. Section 9 (c)
of the Model Act provides:
Every party shall have the right of cross-examinaand shall have the right to
tion of witnesses who testify,
52
submit rebuttal evidence.
This is the law as it should be. Administrative agencies should
be required to follow this rule in every hearing. It is the opinion
of the writer that this model act should be adopted by every state
legislature in order to have full and fair hearings as required by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cross- examination is essential in administrative quasi-iudicial hearings, if the
truth is to be elucidated, for it is by far the best safeguard yet
found for testing the truthfulness and value of human statements.
Our legislatures and courts must continue to protect this essential
right if the requirements for a full and fair hearing are to be maintained. There is no better way to do so than by adopting the model
act. If this seems impractical, every staute governing procedures
of administrative hearings should contain a section requiring that
all parties be given the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses
who testify against them. This would be a great step in the march
toward the goal of fair and full administrative hearings for all.
"-Gellhorn, op. cit. note 51, Model State Administrative
ni. 1122.
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